In December 2003 Mzwimbi went on a well deserved family vacation to the United States, satisfied with the progress and confident that his sprawling empire was on a substantial footing. However a call from a business magnate in January 2004 alerted him to what was termed a looming shake- up in the financial sets sector. It appears that the incoming governor had confided in a few close colleagues and acquaintances about his plans. This confirmed to Mzwimbi the fears that were arising as RBZ refused to adjust to edges which had liquidity challenges.
The last two months of 2003 saw interest rates soar close to 900% p.a., with the RBZ watching helplessly. The RBZ had the tools and capacity to control these rates but nothing was done to ease the situation. This hiking of interest rates wiped out nearly all the bank’s income made within the year. Bankers typically rely on treasury bills (TBs) since they are easily tradable. Their provide had been good until the interest rates skyrocketed. consequently bankers were now borrowing at higher interest rates than the treasury bills could cover. Bankers were put in the uncomfortable position of borrowing expensive money and on-lending it cheaply. An example at Royal Bank was an entrepreneur who borrowed $120 million in December 2003, which by March 2004 had ballooned to $500 million due to the excessive rates. Although the cost of funds was now at 900% p.a., Royal Bank had just increased its interest rates to only 400% p.a, meaning that it was funding the client’s shortfall. However this client could not pay it and just returned the $120 million and demonstrated that he had no capacity to pay back the $400 million interest charge. Most bankers accepted this anomaly because they thought it was a permanent dysfunction perpetuated by the inability of an acting governor to make bold decisions. Bankers believed that once a substantive governor was sworn in he would control the interest rates. Much to their dismay, on assuming the governorship Dr. Gono left the rates untamed and hence the situation worsened. This scenario continued up to August 2004, causing important strain on entrepreneurial bankers.
On reflection, some bankers feel that the central bank deliberately hiked the interest rates, as this would allow it to restructure the financial sets sector. They argue that during the cash crisis of the last half of 2003, bank CEOs would meet often with the RBZ in an effort to find solutions to the crisis. Retrospectively they claim that there is evidence suggesting that the current governor though not appointed however was already in control of the RBZ operations during that time period and was consequently responsible for the untenable interest rate regime.
In January 2004, after his vacation, Mzwimbi was informed by the RBZ that Royal had been accommodated for $2 billion on the 28th of December 2003. The Central Bank wanted to know whether this accommodation should be formalised and placed into the newly produced Troubled Bank Fund. However, this was expensive money both in terms of the interest rates and also in terms of the conditions and terms of the loan. At Trust Bank, access to this facility had already given the Central Bank the right to force out the top executives, restructure the Board and virtually take over the management of the bank.
Royal Bank turned down the offer and used deposits to pay off the money. However the interest rates did not come down.
During the first quarter of 2004 Trust Bank, Barbican bank and Intermarket Bank were identified as distressed and put under harsh corrective orders by the Central Bank.
Royal Bank remained stable until March 2004. People who had their funds locked up in Intermarket Bank withdrew huge sums of funds from Royal Bank while others were moving to foreign owned edges as the perception produced by Central Bank was read by the market to average that entrepreneurial bankers were fraudsters.
Others withdrew their money on the basis that if financial behemoths like Intermarket can sink, then it could happen to any other indigenously controlled bank. Royal Bank had an advantage that in the smaller towns it was the only bank, so people had no choice. However already in this scenario there were no stable deposits as people kept their funds moving to avoid being caught unawares. For example in one week Royal Bank had withdrawals of over $40 billion but weathered the storm without recourse to Central Bank accommodation.
At this time, newspaper reports suggesting some leakage of secret information started appearing. When confronted, one public paper reporter confided that the information was being supplied to them by the Central Bank. These reports were aimed at causing panic withdrawals and hence exposing edges to depositor flight.
In March 2004, at the point of meaningful vulnerability, Royal Bank received a letter from RBZ cancelling the exemption from statutory save requirements. Statutory reserves are funds, (making up a certain percentage of their total deposits), edges are required to place with the Central Bank, at no interest.
When Royal Bank began operations, Mzwimbi applied to the Central Bank – then under Dr Tsumba, for foreign money to pay for supplies, software and technology infrastructure. No foreign money could be availed but instead Royal Bank was exempted from paying statutory reserves for one year, consequently releasing funds which Royal could use to acquire foreign money and buy the needed resources. This was a normal procedure and practice of the Central Bank, which had been made obtainable to other banking institutions in addition. This would also enhance the bank’s liquidity position.
already investors are sometimes offered tax exemptions to encourage and promote investments in any industry. This exemption was delayed due to bungling in the Banking Supervision and Surveillance Department of the RBZ and was consequently only implemented a year later, consequently it would run from May 2003 until May 2004. The premature cancellation of this exemption caught Royal Bank by surprise as its cash flow projections had been based on these commencing in May 2004.
When the RBZ insisted, Royal Bank calculated the statutory reserves and noted that, due to a decline in its deposits, it was not eligible for the payment of statutory reserves at that time. When the bank submitted its returns with zero statutory reserves, the Central Bank claimed that the bank was now due for the whole statutory save since inception. In effect this was not being treated as a statutory save exemption but more as a penalty for evading statutory reserves. Royal Bank appealed. There were conflicting opinions between the Bank Supervision and Capital Markets divisions on the issue as Bank Supervision conceded to the validity of Royal’s position. However Capital Markets insisted that it had instructions from the top to ingemination the complete amount of $23 billion. This was forced onto Royal Bank and transferred without consent to the Troubled edges Fund at expensive rates of 450% p. a.
When FML was demutualising, the executives were concerned about the possibility of being swallowed by its huge strategic partner, Trust Holdings. FML approached Royal Bank and other edges to act as buffers. The agreement was that FML would fund the deal by placing funds with Royal Bank so that Royal would not fund it from its balance sheet.
consequently FML would leave the deposits with Royal Bank for the tenor of the loan. The deal was consummated by Regal Asset Managers and was to mature in December 2004, at which time it was expected that the proportion price of First Mutual would have blossomed, allowing Royal Bank to harvest its investment and exit profitably. The deal resulted in Regal Asset Managers owning 57 million FML shares. Royal Bank gave FML some securities in the form of treasury bills as collateral for the place.
The save Bank and the curator wrote off this investment because at that time FML was suspended at the ZSE. However the fact that it was suspended did not invalidate its value. Recent events have shown that this investment has generated huge capital value for Regal Asset Managers as the ZSE rebounded. however the curator valued this investment negatively. Around March 2004 there had been a contagion effect at FML due to the challenges at Trust Bank. This resulted in the forced departure of the FML CEO and chairman. FML was suspended from the local bourse as investigations into the financing structure of Capital Alliance’s acquisition were carried out. Because of the pressure brought to bear on FML, it wanted to withdraw the deposits held by Royal Bank, contrary to the agreement. FML could not locate and return the treasury bills that had been provided as collateral by Royal. Royal Bank suspected that these had been placed with ENG, another asset management company which collapsed in December 2003. A public row broke out. Royal Bank executives sought counsel from Renaissance Merchant Bank, which had brokered the deal, and the Chairman of the ZSE, who both agreed with Royal that the deal was authentic and FML had to honour the agreement. At this stage FML sought court intervention in an attempt to force Royal Bank into liquidation. already the curator contested the FML position resulting in his taking it for arbitration. Royal’s position remained that if FML fails to return the securities then it will not get the funds.
Royal bank directors claimed political interference on the issue. The Royal Bank executives believe that the governor, against his better judgment, decided to act against Royal Bank under the pretext of the political pressure. In retrospect, the political sustain for cracking the whip at Royal gave credibility to the rumour that the governor had an inner agenda in taking Royal and merging it into ZABG because of its strong branch network.
Royal Bank had been warned by friendly RBZ insiders that if it ever accessed the Troubled Bank Fund it would be in trouble, so it sought to avoid this at all costs.
However on 4th August 2004, Royal was served with papers that effectively placed it under the curator. Interestingly, the curator’s contract was signed two days earlier. Until this time no depositor had ever failed to withdraw his deposits from Royal Bank.
The without of credibility of the save Bank in handling this case is exposed when one considers that some edges were given more than eight months to stabilise under curators, e.g. Intermarket and CFX edges, and were able to retrieve. But Royal and Trust Bank were under the curator for less than two months before being amalgamated. The press raised concerns about the curators assuming the role of undertaker instead of nurse, and hence burying these edges.This seemed to confirm the possibility of a hidden agenda on the part of the Central Bank.
Chando was an excellent financial engineer who set up Victory Financial sets after a stint with MBCA. He had been the brains behind the setting up of the predecessor of Century Discount House which he later sold to Century Holdings. Royal Bank initially had an interest in discount houses and so at inception had included Victor as a meaningful shareholder. He later acquired Barnfords Securities which Royal intended to bring in-house.
Victory Financial sets was involved in foreign money dealings, using offshore companies that bought free funds from Zimbabweans oversea and purchased raw materials for Zimbabwean corporations. One such deal with National Foods went sour and the MD reported it to the Central Bank. On investigations the deal was found to be clean but the RBZ went ahead to publish that he was involved in illegal foreign money transactions and connected this to Royal Bank. However this was a transaction done by a shareholder as an account holder, in which the bank had no interest. What confused matters, was that Victory Financial sets was housed in the same building as Royal Bank.
After failing to nail Chando to any criminal charges, the Central Bank issued an order for Royal Bank to force him out as a shareholder and board member. It is ridiculous that the Central Bank would vet who is a shareholder or not in edges – particularly when the people had no criminal records.
Negotiations with OPEC were underway for it to take over Chando’s shareholding. The save Bank was aware of these developments. OPEC would then help in the recapitalisation in addition as open up lines of credit for the bank.
In September 2004 the executive directors of Royal Bank, Mzwimbi and Durajadi, were arrested on five allegations of fraudulently prejudicing the bank. One of the charges was that they fraudulently used depositors’ funds to recapitalise the bank.
Three of the charges after police investigations were dropped, as they were not true. The two remaining charges were:
a) a conflict of interest on loans that were made obtainable to the directors. The RBZ alleges that they did not disclose their interests when companies controlled by them accessed loans at concessionary rates from the bank. However the enterprising bankers argument these charges, as they claim the Board minutes prove that this interest was disclosed. already the annual financial statements of the bank concede that they accessed loans as part of their employment contract with the bank.
b) money was owed to Finsreal Asset Management. However Mzwimbi argues that Finsreal truly owes them money and not the other way round. Royal Bank shareholders needed to inject money for recapitalisation of the bank and were requested to place their funds with Finsreal Asset Management. Since some had not paid their portion of the recapitalisation by the due date, Royal Financial Holdings, which had an account with Finsreal, paid the money on behalf of the shareholders – who were then indebted to Royal Financial Holdings. Somehow the RBZ confused this transaction as the bank’s funds and consequently accused the
shareholders of using depositors’ funds to recapitalise.
By retrospectively analysing the court case wherein the Royal Bank executive directors are accused of defrauding the bank it appears that the RBZ produced a falsehood in order to frustrate the bankers. The curator who initially refused to take a stand before the RBZ appointed Independent popularity, has in court clearly testified that no monies were stolen from the bank by the directors and that the curator did not (contrary to RBZ assertions) recommend charges against the bankers. In January 2007 the former executive directors of Royal Bank were acquitted by the High Court on the remaining criminal charges after the prosecution failed to present a convincing argument.
Royal Bank assets were sold by the curator to ZABG barely two months after being placed under the curator, without any audited financial statements. The speed at which an agreement of sale was reached is astonishing. The owners of Royal Bank went to court and, after a protracted legal struggle, the court ruled that the assets were sold illegally and hence the sale was “illegal and of no force or effect and consequently null and void”. The court then directed that the owners should popularity to the Central Bank for a determination of the actions of the curators. The Central Bank begrudgingly set up an “independent panel” to adjudicate the case. Strangely ZABG continued to trade on the illegal assets.
The panel advised that the popularity by Royal bank be rejected as it would be difficult to disentangle it from ZABG. They also cited the fact that ZABG had some contractual obligations with third parties who may not want to do business with Royal bank. This strange ruling fails to explain why these considerations were not made when the amalgamation was done. The ruling also redefined the agreements between the curator of Royal bank and ZABG as not being an “agreement of sale” already though the parties which entered into the agreement clearly intended it to be viewed as such. This was a way of circumventing the Supreme Court ruling that the agreement of sale was null and void.
But the panel did not explain how this disposal of the assets should be considered if it was not a sale.
consequently the major shareholders of Royal appealed to the Minister of Finance who upheld the RBZ decision. Mzwimbi and his colleagues have consequently appealed to the courts. In the meanwhile there was a failed attempt to sell the disputed assets by ZABG despite the noticeable legal challenge. Just ice delayed is justice denied.
Mzwimbi and his team have been denied access to all bank records and however are expected to defend themselves. As he characteristically puts it, “We are going into this fight blind folded and our hands bound, while fighting someone who has armour and a sword.”
Around 2002-3 there were press reports suggesting that the ruling party/state wanted to have a stake in the profitable banking sector. A minister of government at the time of the arrest confirmed this to Mzwimbi and his team. Another bank, NMB, had allegedly been assaulted and the major shareholders were told to dispose of their shareholdings to certain politically connected persons. They refused and had to leave the country after some trumped up charges were preferred against them. Unfortunately, the governor faced resistance and the politicians distanced themselves. One native banker reported how he was summoned to the Central Bank governor’s office and informed that he should leave the country, as his bank would be closed. This banker credits Royal Bank’s resistance to being manipulated as the reason why his own bank survived. The bank was placed under curatorship on 4th August 2004. Mzwimbi had secured possible investors for the recapitalisation of the bank just before the deadline of 30th September 2004. Three days before that deadline, Mzwimbi met the curator and explained in detail the position for the recapitalisation exercise. Investors who had shown interest and were in progressive negotiations were OPEC, Fidelity Insurance and some South African investors. He further asked the curator to request the Central Bank for an extension of about a week. The very next day he was arrested on the pretext that he was about to leave the country. Mzwimbi and his team believe that his arrest at that basic stage was meant to intimidate the would-be investors and consequence in the failure to recapitalise. This lends credibility to the view that the decision to acquire the bank and amalgamate it in ZABG had already been made. The recapitalisation would have scuppered these plans. Notably, other edges were given an extension to regularise their recapitalisation plans.
Shakeman Mugari reported that the central bank has in rule agreed to go into into a scheme of arrangement with Royal, Trust and Barbican edges which could see the final resolution of this issue. He argues that the central bank overlooked the value of securities that the edges had pledged to the central bank for the loans. If these are factored in, then the bank shareholders have some meaningful value within ZABG. If this scheme had been consummated it would have protected RBZ officials from being sued in their personal capacity for the loss of value to shareholders. From the article it appears like a memorandum of agreement had been signed to effect a reduction of Allied Financial sets’ proportion in ZABG while the former edges’ shareholders will take up their proportion in proportion to the value of their assets. This seems to indicate that the central bank has noted a weakness in its arguments.
If this proves true Royal Bank could regain a fairly big stake of ZABG due to its assets which included the real estate and its paper assets which had been undervalued.
The legal hassles show that entrepreneurs in volatile environments confront unnecessary political and legal challenges. The rule of law in these countries is sometimes nonexistent. The legislative and political environments, instead of supporting investors, present serious challenges to entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs in these environments have to estimate the associated risk in setting up their enterprises. However a new copy of entrepreneurs who do not fear the vicissitudes of political interference is making a difference. Entrepreneurs recognise that the ecosystem is a restriction but can be manipulated until worthwhile opportunities are exploited for commercial value. These entrepreneurs choose not to be victims of the ecosystem.
Assault on Entrepreneurs’ Character
The information asymmetry whereby the Central Bank played its case in the public press while the accused bankers had no right of response produced a false impression, in the minds of the populace, of entrepreneurs being greedy and unscrupulous.
The Central Bank accused Jeff Mzwimbi and Durajadi Simba of siphoning funds from the bank. An example appeared in a press article in which it was alleged that the sale of Barclays Bank branches to Royal Bank was annulled and the refunded funds were remitted to Mzwimbi and Durajadi at Finsreal Asset Managers and not Royal Bank’s account. This was a clear case of deliberate misinformation as the Central Bank was aware of the truth. Royal Bank had included the buy of the Bulawayo Barclays Bank branch building which Barclays Bank would lease a portion of from Royal Bank. When Royal Bank fell short at the Interbank Clearing House, it renegotiated with Barclays. This was after Royal was threatened that if it did not clear this amount it would be placed into the Troubled Bank Fund – which carried harsh penalties.
The consequence was that Barclays refunded the amount paying it directly to Royal’s Central Bank account. The RBZ acknowledged receiving these funds. How can they now accuse the founding shareholders of siphoning the same funds which went directly to the RBZ account? Mzwimbi insists that Barclays can easily testify to this.
The RBZ also alleged that Mzwimbi and Durajadi withheld information from their CVs on application for the bank licence and hence questioned their integrity. They claimed that Mzwimbi withheld information on his involvement with a failed bank, UMB. But the business plan for Royal Bank which was filed with RBZ clearly states this involvement. The Central Bank would have these records anyway. They also queried Durajadi’s source of funds and cast aspersions on the net worth statement. however Durajadi had been involved in Zimbabwe Trust and a transport business with his brother, which gave him sufficient net worth value.
The RBZ contends that the Board of Royal Bank failed to comply with a directive to recapitalise by 29th July 2004. Royal Bank executives and Board state categorically that they never received this directive. Mzwimbi and his team argue that this is misinformation, as all edges were required to have recapitalised by 30th September 2004.
The regulators also allege that the balance sheet of Royal Bank had a deficit of $140 billion, which the bankers argument. If one were to consider the disputed $23 billion for statutory reserves and the $20 billion as accommodation from the clearing house, this would amount to $77 billion with interests. However with the undervaluing of the assets and the $160 billion which was written off as uncollectible, there would be no negative balance sheet. The contention of the Royal Executives is that the curator, at the behest of the save Bank, deliberately tampered with the accounts to provide a reason for the take-over. This may be validated by the fact that the curator’s balance sheet kept changing whenever he was challenged and he increased the write-offs, already of funds that had since been collected. Since Royal and Trust edges were amalgamated into ZABG, the bank is nevertheless profitable, without any recapitalisation having been carried out. The very fact that this new amalgamated bank can function for this long from insolvent edges’ capital without recapitalising lends credibility to the argument of the Royal Bank’s owners.
The entrepreneurs continue that they were dealing with a Central Bank which was determined to see them sink and not to protect the integrity of the banking system. This ecosystem was not conducive to survival and it amplified normal weaknesses which could have been resolved during normal business.
Mzwimbi and his colleagues refused to give up under challenging situations. Despite intimidation they took the Central Bank to court and refused to budge until justice was done. They were presented with numerous opportunities to quit the country but would not.
It is reported that they have not given up on their dream. They have set up Royal Financial sets in Kenya, despite the challenges in Zimbabwe. Indeed a sign of perseverance. Press reports indicated that they are in negotiations with Trust Bank so that once they win their case they can merge and continue their operations in Zimbabwe. Trust did not confirm or deny this. The more likely scenario however is that both Trust and Royal could reach a compromise with the central bank resulting in them taking up equity in ZABG unprotected to an independent revaluation exercise of the assets which were taken over.
The entrepreneurial journey is fraught with risk but can be very rewarding. Some lessons that can be learned from the case study are as follows:
• Entrepreneurs take calculated risk. Mzwimbi did not use all his resources in the bank but left his shareholding in Econet intact. He also sought to diversify his wealth by keeping some investments with FML and Screen Litho. This has been the mainstay of his wealth creation strategy. The disaster that befell the bank did not completely wipe him out because of this prudent investment strategy.
• Entrepreneurs learn from their experiences. Mzwimbi’s great experiences taught him basic lessons. His international banking experience enabled him to see the emerging trends as Barclays and Standard Chartered withdrew from country towns, creating a route for his entry strategy. His work with Econet taught him perseverance as he and his colleagues fought legal battles with government for the award of the licence. Little did he know that this was just training ground for the battle of his life – the battle for Royal Bank.
• Entrepreneurs need to continuously examine the ecosystem for threats and opportunities. while Mzwimbi and his team were good at noticing the emerging positive trends in the ecosystem at inception, they failed to pick the changes in the regulatory ecosystem when the new governor came on board.
• Entrepreneurial strategy emerges and consequently entrepreneurs should be flexible. Although Royal Bank had a plan to grow at a steady speed, when the opportunity arose to acquire other branches cheaply the entrepreneurs seized the opportunity.
• Entrepreneurs are faced with credibility challenges as customers, regulators and suppliers test the credibility of newcomers. Royal Bank minimised this by recruiting experienced and well known personnel in the market. However the without of institutional shareholders led to credibility gaps with some corporate clients.
• Entrepreneurs need to craft into their organisations both managerial and leadership competences to ensure both the ability to adventure opportunities (entrepreneurial activity) and sustainable company performance (strategic management). The more current view of entrepreneurship transcends just the venture creation and now encompasses strategic growth. Although Mzwimbi was an excellent leader he needed a strong and powerful manager to consolidate the gains and create substantial systems to sustain the rapid growth. Leaders thrive on change while managers thrive on handling complexity and creating order.
• Business is built on relationships as these help in the scanning of the operating ecosystem e.g. basic information about opportunities and threats was obtained from close relationships
Lets close this article with a few questions that an entrepreneur should consider. for example, if Mzwimbi had expanded less aggressively, would Royal Bank have been safer from the regulators? How could Mzwimbi have protected Royal Bank from political and regulatory interference if he expected those risks? If Mzwimbi had chosen to pursue his enterprise ideas in a country with a more dependable political and regulatory ecosystem, how would he have performed? Would it have been wiser to keep the equipment, real estate and other assets in Royal Financial Holdings or other corporate entity and only lease them to the bank? In that scenario would the predators have been able to pounce on the bank?
supplies: I Dr Tawafadza A. Makoni confirm being the author of this work. The material for this case study was drawn from my interviews with Mr J Mzwimbi CEO of Royal Bank in February 2006 and two Royal Bank Board Members. Some material was drawn from an unpublished Royal Bank Strategic Business Plan, (2000)